source literature. 3 However, declassified material from British government archives, notably from the Ministry of Defence (MOD), demonstrates that both the UK and Oman raised and trained groups of exiled Mahra tribesmen -exiled from the PDRY -to launch cross-border raids into South Yemen between late 1972 and early 1975.
Covert action can be defined as clandestine activity conducted by a government to influence political, economic, and strategic conditions in a foreign country, in which the former's involvement is intended to be both concealed and plausibly deniable. Proxy warfare -defined here as a country's use of non-state paramilitary groups either as a supplementary means of waging war or as a substitute for overt use of force against an adversary -can be classified as a type of covert operation, being carried out by states either as a means of coercing an adversary, disrupting the latter militarily, or indeed for a transformative objective such as regime change in, the promotion of separatism within, or the annexation of a territory from a state subjected to proxy attack. 4 As Andrew Rathmell observes, covert operations and proxy warfare have been characteristics of Middle Eastern politics since the mid-20 th century, with Arab regimes using subversion and clandestine support for terrorism and insurgency in their own internecine struggles. 5 Yet external powers have also used similar means to pursue their own regional interests; prime examples of such activity include the UK Secret Intelligence Service's (SIS) involvement alongside the CIA in both the successful August 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in Iran and a failed one in Syria in November 1956, as well as Britain's clandestine backing of royalist rebels fighting the Egyptian-backed republican regime in Yemen between 1962 and 1967. 6 As was the case with British and Omani covert operations against the PDRY, two or more states can collaborate in proxy warfare against a common enemy, although in these cases the sponsor states had differing political objectives for doing so.
Using material from British archival sources, this article seeks to describe the origins and the scope of the Mahra raids into the PDRY in the latter phases of the Dhofar war (which were given the codename Operation Dhib by the British), examining in particular the reasons why the UK and Oman sought to employ these tribesmen as proxies. It is not intended to provide a comprehensive account of the Dhofar war, but to highlight an aspect of this conflict which has hitherto received very little academic study. The declassified evidence in the UK National Archives does not provide the basis for a complete account of Operation Dhib, yet there is sufficient archival material to outline when the British and Omani governments raised the Mahra tribal militias (known collectively as the firqat, with each individual formation a firqa 7 ) for cross-border incursions, what the objectives for proxy warfare were, and what challenges British civilian and military officials faced in managing this covert operation.
THE DHOFAR WAR AND THE UK'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
In April 1963, around 100 nationalist rebels launched an insurgency in Dhofar, taking up arms against the reactionary sultan, Sa'id bin Taymur, who was a long-standing ally of the UK. The character of the insurgency changed after December 1967, following the British withdrawal from South Arabia (what became South Yemen) and the emergence of a Marxist-Leninist regime in 'Aden. Provided with sanctuary, funds, training, and arms by the South Yemenis, the PFLO insurgency grew rapidly in size and scale, and gradually drove the small and poorly equipped Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) into the coastal plain of Dhofar, threatening the provincial capital of Salala by the summer of 1970. On July 23 of that year, Sa'id was overthrown in a palace coup by his son, Qaboos, who was discreetly backed by British military officers assigned by the UK government on secondment with the SAF. Over the following five years, a progressively expanded SAF fought to wrest control of Dhofar away from the PFLO, aided by loan service officers, military supplies, and a contingent of the 22 nd Special Air Service Regiment (22 SAS) sent from the UK, known as the "British Advisory Training Team" (BATT). Oman also received significant military and financial assistance from other Gulf states, most notably an Iranian expeditionary force which was sent to the Sultanate in December 1973. By December 1975, the remnants of the PFLO had been driven across the border into the PDRY, although some insurgent elements continued to fight in Dhofar into the late 1970s.
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For both the Labour and Conservative (1970-74) governments in office during this period, the UK's support for the Sultanate of Oman -and in particular the role of British military personnel both in directing the war against the PFLO and in combat operations alongside the SAF in Dhofar -was not to be disclosed to Parliament or to the British or international media. 9 Britain backed the royal regime fearing that an insurgent victory would destabilize Oman and other pro-Western states in the Gulf, threatening access to regional oil supplies. Officials in Whitehall were particularly concerned that following the withdrawal of British forces from their bases in Bahrain and Sharjah, the newly independent Gulf states of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates were vulnerable to revolutionary movements similar to the PFLO. 10 However, the parlous state of the British econo-7. In Modern Standard Arabic, the plural of the word "firqa" is firaq rather than firqat. However, the British archival documents consistently refer to the latter. It is possible to infer the British erred in their rendering of the word or it is a local variation.
8 my and the demands placed by the UK armed forces' commitments (with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the counterterrorist campaign in Northern Ireland being MOD priorities, in addition to being commitments requiring substantial numbers of troops) precluded overt military assistance to Oman and imposed limits on the number of advisors and SAS soldiers Britain could contribute to the war effort. Ministers and officials in Whitehall were also continually wary of either a prolonged embroilment in the counterinsurgency campaign in Dhofar, or indeed an escalation of the war into a confrontation with the PDRY. They were also keen to withdraw even the limited number of British military personnel from Oman once this was politically acceptable to the indigenous government; not to mention the US and regional allies such as Saudi Arabia. The UK government's concerns over escalation became particularly evident when the SAF became embroiled in border clashes with South Yemeni forces in May 1972 and October 1975. 11 While the UK never had more than a few hundred troops in Oman during the Dhofar War, it had a disproportionate share of influence during the campaign because Britons occupied key decision-making positions within the Sultanate. The commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces (CSAF) was a British Army officer on secondment; a brigadier prior to December 1972, and a major-general after. Despite a policy of "Omanization" implemented in the early 1970s, up until the war's end the officer corps of the SAF consisted largely of loan service personnel from the British Army, the Royal Navy (including the Royal Marines), and the Royal Air Force.
12 Until Qaboos assumed the role for himself in May 1973, the post of sultan's defence secretary was filled by two British officers during this period, Brigadier Pat Waterfield and, after January 1970, Colonel Hugh Oldman. The Omani Intelligence Service (OIS, known after 1974 as the Oman Research Department (ORD) was also created by the SIS and British military intelligence officers assigned to the SAF. Nonetheless, the sultans were not passive actors and British "advice" was not always heeded. One of the principal reasons why the UK government and British officials in Oman colluded in Sa'id's overthrow was his reluctance either to increase the size of the SAF or to conduct an effective counterinsurgency campaign against the PFLO that tempered repression with reforms. Qaboos himself has traditionally been regarded as more receptive to British influence than his father, yet he was ready to assert his own authority as sultan and also frequently overruled the military guidance provided by the CSAF, particularly after the "oil shock" that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli War increased Oman's oil revenues. 13 As noted below, there was a clear divergence between British and Omani policy arising from Qaboos's anger over South Yemeni support for the PFLO, and his desire to confront the PDRY. As far as covert activity is concerned, Rory Cormac states that support for the Yemeni royalists during the 1960s was coordinated in Whitehall via the Joint Action Group, which remained a means of directing British clandestine paramilitary operations up until at least the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-89.
14 In the case of the Mahra raids, the initiative came from British officers serving with the SAF and Omani intelligence, responding to Qaboos's wishes, and the files contain no reference to the Joint Action Group. Command and control for cross-border operations appeared to have been provided by the CSAF and the brigade commander in Dhofar, reporting through the chiefs of staff (COS) in London. Ministerial authorization for the raids was provided in late 1972, although the archival evidence suggests that the most consistent supporter of this exercise in proxy warfare was General (later Field Marshal) Sir Michael Carver, who served as chief of the general staff from April 1971 to October 1973, and was subsequently the overall commander of the British armed forces (the Chief of the Defence Staff) from October 1973 to October 1976.
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THE ORIGINS OF THE MAHRA OPERATION
The Mahra tribe traditionally inhabited the cross-border region between Saudi Arabia, Oman and the former PDRY, between Najd, Dhofar, and the Yemeni province of Mahra. 16 Following South Yemeni independence in December 1967, the lack of a clearly demarcated border contributed to clashes between the SAF and PDRY forces, and the bitter hostility between Muscat and 'Aden (arising principally from South Yemeni support to the PFLO insurgency) precluded a diplomatic resolution to the frontier dispute.
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While Mahra was formally part of the Eastern 'Aden Protectorate until December 1967, until 1963 and before independence the tribes there had enjoyed considerable autonomy, and it was only in the final four years of their colonial presence that the British sought to extend their authority into the Mahra region.
18 After the British withdrawal from South Arabia, Mahra became the sixth governorate of South Yemen, although its tribes became more restive as the new regime in 'Aden became progressively more Marxist-Leninist in both its ideology and policies. By October 1972 there were 75 Mahra exiles serving with the firqat forces, the Dhofari tribal militias established by Qaboos and trained by 22 SAS under the guise of the BATT. Together, the Mahra and Hadramawt Governorates of the PDRY were roughly the size of England, but the extent of government control over both was limited -British intelligence estimated that there were only 1,000 South Yemeni troops to cover the two governorates. 19 The eastern PDRY was therefore theoretically well-suited for proxy warfare because of its size, terrain, and the truculence of the local tribes.
The concept of using the Mahras as proxies originated in the summer of 1969, at a time when the war in Dhofar was going badly for the SAF. In early June the CSAF, Brigadier Corran Purdon, was informed by his intelligence officers that a deserter from the South Yemeni army had contacted them with a request for arms, funds, and safe haven. The unnamed defector pledged in return to provide 50 Mahra volunteers to help start a tribal rebellion, which would capture forts under government control, attack the PFLO's base in the border town of Hawf, and cut the insurgency's supply lines into South Yemen. 20 Purdon was also attracted to the possibility that a Mahra revolt might create a sympathetic buffer state between Oman and the PDRY, although Sa'id rejected this proxy warfare proposal for that very reason, fearing that Mahra separatism would lead to territorial claims against Oman, destabilizing the Sultanate in the process. 21 Qaboos, however, would have no such qualms.
OPERATION DHIB COMMENCES, OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1972
1972 proved to be the pivotal year for the Dhofar War. While the PFLO still posed a serious military threat to the SAF's control over the province, the latter began to undertake successful operations to contain the insurgency. In April 1972, Sultan Qaboos ordered the occupation of a defensive position at Sarfayt, near the border, so as to cut the insurgency's supply lines to South Yemen. However, this operation (known as Simba) tied a battalion of Omani troops in a static defensive position which was vulnerable to artillery and mortar fire from across the frontier, and the garrison at Sarfayt could do little to interdict the traffic of arms, supplies, and reinforcements across the border. Sustaining Sarfayt stretched the army and Sultan of Oman's Air Force (SOAF) to its limits, but the position could not be abandoned because it would constitute a propaganda victory for the PFLO. Nonetheless, the insurgents also overreached themselves with a failed attempt to seize the town and fortress of Mirbat in eastern Dhofar (on July 19, 1972), experiencing a costly defeat in the process, and the PFLO's efforts to build up a support network in northern Oman were decisively disrupted by the OIS and police with a series of arrests in December 1972. By the year's end, the sultan was reportedly frustrated at the stalemate in Dhofar, while both Oldman and the two senior officers serving as CSAF (Brigadier John Graham and, after September 1972, MajorGeneral Tim Creasey) were concerned that Qaboos would order further operations that were beyond the limited capabilities that his armed forces and his British backers could provide. On the other hand, the Mahra Goverornate of South Yemen was experiencing increasing tribal unrest, which the British defence attaché in Muscat noted, "could grow to represent a major distraction for the PDRY forces thereby lessening their willingness and ability to help the [PFLO] ."
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On October 8, 1972, Sultan Qaboos sent a request to the British government, via the UK embassy in Muscat, for assistance in training a Mahra firqa for "unattributable [sic] small scale guerrilla operations in the 6 th province of the PDRY." The defence attaché, Colonel C.S. Welch, informed the COS that "[inquiries] across the border indicate that the people will welcome and support any force attempting to restore their sovereignty." 23 The sultan requested an additional presence of SAS personnel, to supplement the BATT, which was training the Dhofari militias, and, in addition to this request through official channels, an OIS officer also contacted Brigadier John Simpson, the commander of the British Army's special forces, to request SAS assistance. 24 The proposal gained military approval, particularly after General Carver's visit to Oman on October 18; his military assistant noted that cross-border raids by the Mahra could "bring dividends," "[winning] hearts and minds in the 6 th Government [sic] Area of the PDRY." PFLO activities in South Yemen had been "entirely unmolested," and paramilitary operations including sabotage, the mining of roads, and ambushes on PFLO and PDRY military convoys would disrupt the insurgents and their backers. 25 In this respect, a possible additional motive for instigating covert operations was revenge against the South Yemeni regime, not only for its support for the PFLO but also for the successful insurgency its precursor, the National Liberation Front, had waged against British rule in South Arabia from 1962 to 1967. Donald Hawley, the British ambassador to Oman, expressed his own concerns over a resort to proxy warfare. While acknowledging that the sultan's request was backed by British military officers in the SAF and the MOD, he stated that while "[a] diversion in the sixth province might take some of the heat out of rebel operations in Dhofar . . . I have not been personally convinced that the game is worth the candle even from the Sultanate's point of view." Hawley pointed out that Britain still had diplomatic relations with South Yemen, and that there would be political consequences if the UK provided military support to the Mahra. If any British-trained tribesmen were captured by South Yemeni security forces, the operation would no longer be "unattributable," and Hawley also suspected that any program of cross-border raids would be a prolonged one. already inadequate) from meeting the rebellion within Oman itself," that Mahra separatism posed a potential threat to the integrity of the Sultanate, and that the cross-border operation could become public knowledge in the UK, which would in turn generate "undesirable publicity" for the 22 SAS Regiment (22SAS) and its role fighting alongside the firqat forces in Dhofar itself. Wright nonetheless argued that British support for covert action would help the UK restrain Sultan Qaboos's desire for overt military retaliation against South Yemen, while the Mahra could be used as a bargaining chip to persuade 'Aden to stop backing the insurgents. He also noted that if "the operation goes ahead with or without SAS help, Britain will probably be accused of conniving at it," and that "[we] may as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb, therefore; and try to make the operation as effective as possible." 26 Ultimately, prevailing opinion within both the FCO and MOD stressed that despite the political risks involved in training the Mahra, the lack of British backing would enrage Sultan Qaboos, whose plans for covert action were supported by Saudi Arabia. The Saudis themselves -reportedly bent upon achieving regime change in 'Aden -would also blame the British for appeasement in the face of South Yemen's subversive intentions in the region. Officials in Whitehall recommended that assistance be offered, provided that it was limited and enabled the British to disavow any responsibility if any raiding parties were eliminated or captured by the South Yemenis. Six soldiers from 22SAS would be involved in training the Mahra under the cover already provided by the BATT; the Mahra themselves could, if necessary, be passed off as a firqa raised for counterinsurgency operations in Oman itself. 27 On November 23, 1972, the British Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy Committee authorized Operation Dhib, giving specific instructions that SAS troops were not to accompany the Mahra on their cross-border raids. Prime Minister Edward Heath also stipulated that their authorization was valid for six months, after which the COS would have to request renewed approval, and that "any breach of security could lead to an immediate withdrawal of the SAS team and a [disavowal] of SAS involvement." 28 This caveat meant that unlike the Claret cross-border raids conducted during the confrontation with Indonesia over Borneo (1963-66), British military personnel would not become involved in combat operations in South Yemen itself. Indeed, BATT soldiers were barred from operating within 16 miles (25 kilometers) of the border. 29 Therefore, Operation Dhib was principally instigated as a concession to Sultan Qaboos in the hope that the employment of the Mahra as proxies would help the British withstand the sultan's demands for direct military intervention against South Yemen. In this respect, the use of special forces personnel to train them was as much a means of controlling these guerrillas as of enhancing their effectiveness in covert warfare. In fact, the Mahra project not only failed to satisfy the Omani monarch's inclinations towards escalation, but it also encouraged him to demand an expansion of cross-border operations in the process.
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THE EXPANSION OF OPERATION DHIB, 1973
From the British perspective, the main Mahra formation was Firqat al-Badiya (literally, "the desert militia"), established in autumn 1971 to patrol the border between Dhofar and South Yemen. Following the Heath government's decision to support limited cross-border raids, this firqa had had an SAS training team assigned to it in January 1973, and it became based at Shisr, 70 miles from the border. This force consisted of around 100 fighters, and was judged by Colonel Welch to be "probably incapable of more than the odd nuisance raid or skirmish, albeit deep in PDRY territory." There were at least two other Mahra groups active at this time; the Jaysh al-'Asifa (literally, "army of the storm"), recruited with Saudi funding for raids into the Shabwa and Hadramawt governorates of South Yemen, and an unnamed unit of 250 Mahra tribesmen, which Sultan Qaboos established without consulting the British government.
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Detailed information on the scope of the Mahra operations is scant, particularly for the Jaysh al-'Asifa, which had no British direction or training. There is also no information on the specifics of the training programs, or details about how the Mahra were armed and trained, although it is reasonable to presume that advice on ambush tactics and setting mines was provided, and the weapons supplied were likely not British in origin. 32 What we now know is that the cross-border incursions appear to have been sporadic in frequency, involving 30 fighters at the most with each incursion, and the attacks on PDRY targets were small in scale. A raid on a South Yemeni military convoy in May 1973, reportedly destroyed seven trucks, with the Mahra killing 22 enemy soldiers and capturing one. 33 On May 2, 1973, Sultan Qaboos, evidently dissatisfied with the limited number of cross-border operations, ordered Major-General Creasey to establish the southern Mahra firqa. The CSAF noted that due to tribal feuds between the latter and the northern clansmen serving with Firqat al-Badiya, this new formation could not be based at Shisr, and a second SAS team would be required to train it. Hawley reported that the governor of Dhofar Province, Burayk bin Hamud al-Ghafiri, sided with the southern Mahra and advocated the creation of a separate firqa for them; Burayk had a considerable amount of influence over Qaboos because he had played a key role in instigating the coup of July 1970. The ambassador, however, regarded the southern Mahra as "unimpressive," and Creasey also "urged [the Sultan] not to let the politically grasping but militarily ineffectives of (sic) the South sour and adversely affect the Northerners who are presently doing so well." 34 In Whitehall, there were concerns within the FCO over the impact of extended cross-border activity, and also the threat of reprisal attacks by the PFLO against SAS personnel in Dhofar. The COS also noted that the Mahra tribes may have been infiltrated by South Yemeni intelligence, as there had been "a small number of low-grade defections from the Mahra Firqat and subsequent reference to their operations on Aden Radio," although these broadcasts had "not attracted any adverse publicity elsewhere." The British military chiefs also dismissed the likelihood that expanded operations would increase the already considerable risk to the 22SAS contingent in Dhofar, and argued that Mahra operations provided an "additional and useful source of intelligence" on PDRY military capabilities for the MOD's Defence Intelligence Service. 35 Creasey received ministerial authorization to train the southern Mahra on June 1, 1973, although contrary to his initial recommendations the British government refused to deploy a second SAS team, directing CSAF that all training for cross-border incursions should take place at Firqat al-Badiya's base at Shisr regardless of tribal tensions. The southern Mahra were also confined to patrolling and internal security operations in Dhofar until Operation Dhib's subsequent ministerial review, in January 1974. 36 In fact, their firqa was never deployed on guerrilla operations in South Yemen.
CONTROLLING THE MAHRA, 1974/75
During the course of 1974 the military situation in Dhofar changed decisively in the Sultanate's favor, not least because Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran sent a brigade of troops backed by a strong air force contingent to reinforce the SAF. In March 1974, Labour regained office following the British general election, and although Harold Wilson's government was as committed to supporting the Omani monarchy as Heath's had been, both he and his defence secretary, Roy Mason, expressed the same caveats about escalation and overcommitment of scant UK military resources as their Conservative predecessors. This was augmented in Labour's case by the hostility that its left-wing members of Parliament and party members felt towards overseas interventions, demonstrated by the condemnation that some backbenchers offered towards British policy in Oman. 37 Thanks mainly to Iranian military support, the SAF was eventually able to drive the bulk of the PFLO out of Dhofar by December 1975, although during this phase of the war the potential for an all-out confrontation with South Yemen became more pronounced. This scenario was an issue of considerable concern for the British because the South Yemeni armed forces were well-equipped for conventional warfare (its inventory included Soviet-supplied fighter jets and bombers) in comparison to the SAF. Creasey noted in August 1974 that 'Aden had bolstered its military and security force presence in the Hadramawt and Mahra Governorates, due to "our trans border operations, our frontier positions, and the Iranian presence in Dhofar," and by the end of the year there were about 3,000 South Yemeni troops facing the Omani frontier. By this point, South Yemeni militiamen had infiltrated Oman in order to bolster the PFLO, and in October 1975 there were a series of border clashes, culminating with SAF artillery and SOAF air strikes on Hawf.
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Firqat al-Badiya was regarded as an effective proxy by the British, particularly for the intelligence it gathered on South Yemeni military capabilities, although following an incursion in the autumn of 1973, Major-General Creasey ordered a pause in their operations on October 20. As one senior MOD official noted, this raid "produced a strong PDRY reaction and measures by them against local tribesmen suspected of assisting the [Firqa al-Badiya]. As a result CSAF has temporarily stopped cross-border action by that Firqat [sic] until the dust settles." General Carver also suspected that the northern Mahra raids could have provoked a South Yemeni air strike on Makinat Shihan, an outpost on the border occupied by the SAF and Dhofari militiamen, on November 18. Nonetheless, incursions into South Yemen resumed in March 1974, and over the next six months the Firqat al-Badiya carried out three incursions, killing at least 20 enemy personnel. Even in this case, as one of Creasey's staff noted, this force was directed to "restrict [its] operations to low scale guerrilla type raids, and reconnaissance patrols," and it was "forbidden to engage PDRY regular forces in full scale battle" in order to "reduce the risk of retaliation [against Oman], and to keep to the minimum repressive measures by PDRY against the Mahra tribe." 39 The CSAF was therefore not only concerned about provoking a wider confrontation with South Yemen, but also showed an awareness that a cycle of rebellion and security force retaliation in the Mahra territory could lead to a civil war within South Yemen, which in turn would increase the likelihood of hostilities with Oman.
The fate of the southern Mahra firqa is less easy to determine. Although ministerial authorization for training this formation was provided in June 1973, from official correspondence it appears that contrary to British wishes it was not with the Firqat al-Badiya, presumably because of the intertribal tensions between the northern and southern Mahra noted above. The declassified evidence does not indicate what position Qaboos himself took, although, as CDS General Carver noted, the sultan "attaches great importance to the Southern Mahra" firqa, and may well have withstood British requests to send them to Shisr for training. This formation was directed by Creasey to "operate initially inside Oman," but the CSAF reported "that this has been ineffective because of its inadequate training, control and tasking." One MOD official noted that if the southern Mahra were used on cross-border raids in their current condition "their operations could prove an embarrassment." In early January 1974, Creasey therefore repeated the Sultan's request for a second 22SAS team to support this formation. This request received the support of the COS and MOD, and with ministerial approval special forces personnel were attached to the southern Mahra for the next five months. 40 This extension of Operation Dhib proved, however, to be short-lived. While the British envisaged cross-border raids as a means of satisfying Sultan Qaboos's urge for wider retaliation against South Yemen, the southern Mahra were separatists bent upon establishing an independent state, and their relationship with the governor of Dhofar undermined the efforts of British military officials to control them. There was therefore, as one MOD official observed, "a decline of discipline and a measure of challenge to effective command by CSAF," and faced with the possibility that the southern Mahra firqa would go rogue, Major-General Creasey ordered the withdrawal of the SAS contingent assigned to it, ceasing training for cross-border incursions and confining this formation to counterinsurgency operations in Dhofar alongside locally raised militias. Given that the British were anxious to avoid a prolonged engagement in Oman, and due to their limited aspirations for the Mahra proxies, the demise of this firqa was probably welcomed by officials in London and Muscat. 41 In contrast, Firqat al-Badiya remained operational until at least January 1975, when Carver again requested Defence Secretary Mason's approval for the continuation both of Operation Dhib and the SAS training mission for the northern Mahra. Declassified UK government files do not disclose whether further ministerial authorization was forthcoming, or exactly when the cross-border raids ceased. What is evident is that both Creasey and his superiors in the COS believed that the 22SAS training teams not only prepared the Mahra for incursions into South Yemen, but also restricted their scope in accordance with CSAF's intentions and UK government policy. As one British officer attached to SAF headquarters noted, the SAS soldiers involved "have played an invaluable, if unspectacular, role under very difficult and trying conditions both of climatic (sic) and those endemic to dealing with the Mahra tribesmen," and had enabled the British to counter both Sultan Qaboos's more ambitious intention to destabilize South Yemen and their Mahra proxies' dream of independence from 'Aden. As such, British special forces "have played a vital role in preventing these operations from escalating into full scale fighting, from which Oman and SAF, would tend to lose more than they gain." 42 Operation Dhib therefore ran contrary to other documented cases of covert action and proxy warfare, as the UK's main purpose in supporting the Mahra's crossborder raids was to influence the policy of an ally (the Omani monarchy) rather than an adversary (the PDRY).
CONCLUSIONS
Due to the limitations of the documentary evidence there are certain questions which this article cannot address, one of which is the extent to which the Mahra raiding parties were supported by their tribal counterparts in People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (the PDRY or South Yemen). The second involves the history of Jaysh al-'Asifa (Army of the Storm), the Saudi-sponsored firqa (militia) which operated without British oversight. The third concerns the exact end of the Mahra operation, although there is fragmentary evidence to suggest Saudi Arabia was instigating tribal subversion in the PDRY during the early 1980s; such activity (if indeed it was conducted) was possibly a legacy of Operation Dhib. In the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (December 25-27, 1979) the British did consider renewed covert action against the PDRY, although at least one senior diplomat in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office expressed his opposition, describing South Yemen as "a country of venal [and] untrustworthy intriguers," and asserting that any attempt to influence local proxies there was "a lottery." While British assistance to the Afghan mujahideen is a matter of historical record, we do not know if this proposal to instigate revolt in the PDRY had any concrete results. Indeed, given South Yemen's volatility during the 1980s it is doubtful as to whether significant external covert action was required to destabilize it. 43 What declassified British government files do demonstrate is that the UK's role in waging proxy warfare against South Yemen during the early 1970s does not conform to established theories about why states conduct covert paramilitary operations. Sultan Qaboos of Oman appears to have intended to use the Mahra in a coercive role, responding to the PDRY's own support for the insurgency in Dhofar, whilst the Saudis (at least according to British officials) wanted to overthrow the Marxist-Leninist regime in 'Aden. In contrast, whilst there was a hope that the Mahra could disrupt the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) with its cross-border attacks, Operation Dhib was primarily viewed both by the British government, and British officers attached to the Omani armed forces as a means of curbing Qaboos's demands for punitive action, which could lead to a war between South Yemen and Oman. Such a scenario would in turn either oblige Britain to commit itself further to its ally's defense -placing a potentially intolerable burden on its overstretched armed forces -or would lead to an embarrassing decision to abandon the Sultanate of Oman to its fate, which would have been a damaging blow both for Western interests and the UK's residual influence in the region. British officials were also aware that Saudi Arabia was a rival for influence in Oman, and that Saudi officials were telling Sultan Qaboos that the UK would prove to be an unreliable ally. The Mahra cross-border raids were therefore primarily a means of addressing the Omani monarch's wishes and of forestalling any Omani policy decisions that could turn the counterinsurgency campaign in Dhofar into an inter-state confrontation between the Sultanate and the PDRY. They were also intended to demonstrate to Qaboos that the British were dependable partners, even if
